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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Defendant/Appellant

(Husband)

respectfully

submits

the

fallowing reply brief. This brief first addresses the seven points
rfeised in Husband's Brief of Appellant and then addresses the five
points raised in Wife's cross-appeal.1
life's Brief of Appellee-Cross Appellant responded to
Hfisband's appeal through Points I through VI. Wife commences her
cross appeal with Point VII. Herein Husband addresses Points I
through VII of his appeal and then addresses points VII through XI
of Wife's cross appeal, citing Wife's Point VII as "Point VII Cross
Appeal".

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DOUBLE ASSESSING
HUSBAND FOR SEA DOO DEBT AND HOUSEHOLD ITEMS, AND FOR
ASSESSING HUSBAND FOR IRA FUNDS EXPENDED FOR THE BENEFIT
OF BOTH PARTIES
SEA DOOS
Wife overlooks, or deliberately avoids, the essential fact
that the trial court awarded Husband

Sea Doos valued

at only

$7,500.00 while inequitably offsetting such amount by ordering
Husband to assume $12,500.00 in debt associated therewith.
$5,000.00

error

must

be

adjusted

either

by

granting

This

Husband

$2,500.00 more in property or reducing the amount of his debt by
such amount.

The net adjustment must be to increase Husband's

share of the home equity by $2,500.00.
HOUSEHOLD ITEMS
Wife

does

not

dispute

that

Husband

purchased

at

least

$4,577.00 in personal property after the parties separated, which
was awarded to Husband by the trial court.
on

appeal,

questions

whether

such

She, for the first time

funds

were

purchased

from

proceeds of the IRA alleging a lack of documentary proof at trial.
However, at trial Wife made no best evidence or other objection to
Husband's Exhibit D-28 when it was received by stipulation.
2317-8)

(R.

Previously, during adverse examination of Husband, Wife

only challenged the actual amount spent on childrens' furniture
from the IRA, not that the funds came from the IRA.

(R. 2313)

Not

having reserved such issue at trial, Wife is precluded from raising
it on appeal.

Utah R. Civ. P. 46; Doe v. Hafen,

772 P. 2d 456 (Utah

App. 1989), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
2

Further, it was uncontroverted that Husband's household items
were purchased after the parties separated.
awarded

property

acquired

after

Therefore, Husband was

separation

which

acquired with the IRA proceeds, or, arguendo,

was

either

Husband's post-

separation income which was reserved to him by the trial court
after payment of temporary child support and alimony.

Either route

improperly results in double-assessment to Husband.
Finally, the trial court having made no express finding on
this issue, must be deemed to have accepted the values set forth in
Exhibit D-28 as accurate, since Wife stipulated to such exhibit.
(R.

2317)

contrary.

Certainly,

nothing

in

the

records

indicates

the

The effect is to have double-assessed Husband $4,577.00

for personal property he received.
IRA VALUE ATTRIBUTABLE TO HUSBAND
Wife invites this Court to assume a finding which was never
made by the trial court, to-wit: that the trial court deliberately
intended to double-assess Husband for taxes he paid to punish
Husband for removing funds from the IRA contrary to the Court's
order.

(Brief of Appellee-Cross Appellant, p. 27-8)

However,

nowhere in the findings of fact or in any ruling by the trial court
did the trial court state that it intended to punish Husband by
double-assessing him on the taxes he had previously paid.

Rather,

the trial court expressly required Husband to be responsible for
the $6,210.00 tax penalty associated with Husband's unauthorized
withdrawal of $62,100.00 from the IRA, clearly stating that such
was Husband's sanction.

(R. 1642-1643, Finding of Fact 12)
3

That the trial court ordered the parties to file a joint 1994
tax return and be equally responsible for the balance of taxes
thereon shows the trial court's intent that the 1994 tax liability
be equally shared by the parties, including the portion of taxes
already paid by Husband with proceeds from the IRA.
2390-2391, 2440, 2505, Exh. D-28)

(R. 2317-2318,

The trial court made a math

error in crediting Husband with still possessing $22,960.00 which
Husband had long since expended for taxes owed equally by both
parties.2

This error must be corrected under Endrody

v.

Endrody,

914 P.2d 1166, 1170-1, (Utah App. 1996) .
Cases cited by Wife do not apply herein as the trial court did
not find that Husband had not expended the funds on taxes.

Having

received Exhibit D-28 by stipulation3, the trial court made no such
finding and, to the contrary, ordered only that Husband bear full
responsibility for the $6,210.00 tax penalty associated with the
early IRA withdrawal.

As noted previously, Wife has waived any

argument regarding lack of documentation by not having raised and
reserved same at trial.
Mathematical errors by the trial court require that this Court
adjust downwards Wife's share of the home equity by the amount of
$21,756.00 as detailed in Brief of Appellant at page 22.

2

Wife never disputed that Husband had paid $44,640.00 in
estimated taxes for 1994 as reflected by Exhibit D-19, and the
court clearly found such to be true.
3

Exhibit D-28 was Husband's accounting of use of the funds
from the IRA. Wife did not challenge that $22,960.00 of the IRA
funds were paid to the IRS during her adverse examination of
Husband. (R. 2390-2391)
4

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THE EXPENSE OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXES ON THE
MARITAL HOME AND THEREBY ASSESSING ALL OF SUCH TAXES TO
HUSBAND.
FURTHER, THE NEW TAX LAW MAY SUBSTANTIALLY
INCREASE HUSBAND'S TAX LIABILITY.
Appellant recognizes that since the date of trial and since
Appellant filed his Brief of Appellant, Congress has changed the
capital gains tax laws regarding sales of homes. However, contrary
to Wife's contention, the change in the tax law may well result in
a greater tax disaster to Husband.
Section 121 of Title 26 U.S.C. as recently amended is set
forth

in Appendix A.

exclusion

would

requirements of

be

Under

available

Section

121(b)(1)

to Husband

Section 121(a). 4

a

provided

$250,000.00
he

met

However, to qualify for the

exclusion under Section 121(a), Husband must have owned and

in the home for

4

at least

the

two of the five

years

resided

preceding the date

Husband reserved this issue, when he argued to the trial

court:
The Court has also failed to consider the capital gains
consequences.
The capital gains should be divided
equally or prorated based upon who derives the most
profit from the sale of the house. (R. 1232)
The trial court was clearly on notice that taxes were being
discussed by the words "capital gains consequences", as taxes are
the most obvious and important "consequences" associated with
capital gains.
Exhibit D-24 shows that the home had equity of
about $183,000.00 above the mortgage balance at time of trial.
Wife argues that the record fails to reflect the $265,000.00 tax
basis of the home.
Even without an express record of the tax
basis, it is clear that the home had a basis somewhere in excess of
$176,165.10, the mortgage balance as of time of trial, thus showing
that the capital gain could be as high as $183,000.00. (Exh. D-24)
Therefore, the record was sufficient to make clear that a
substantial tax issue needed to be addressed.
5

of sale.

Even if, arguendo,

The home has not yet been sold.

were to be sold by October 15, 1991,
the exclusion.

it

Husband would not qualify for

Husband owned the home as of October 15, 1992, five

years before the date of the hypothetical sale.
was ordered out of the home in August, 1994.

However, Husband

Therefore, he would

only have lived in the home between October 15, 1992, and August,
1994, a period of less than two years.

With each day beyond

October 15, 1997, that the home does not sell, Husband falls short
another day of having met the two year residence requirement.
Section 121(c) is the typical nightmare of tax law drafting.
It appears to entitle a home owner not meeting the requirements of
Section 121(a) to a pro-rated use of the $250,000.00 exclusion to
the extent
occurred.
contingent

a portion of the two years living requirement
Such
upon

pro-rated

availability,

the owner meeting

the

however,

requirement

would
of

has
be

Section

121(c) (2) (B) , namely that "such sale or exchange is by reason of a
change in place of employment, health, or, to the extent provided
in the regulations, unforeseen circumstances."

The sale of the

home herein will not occur as the result of change of place of
employment or for health reasons.

No one knows what "unforeseen

circumstances" means, but it may, or may not, apply to Husband
because the home is being sold as the result of a decree of divorce
which in and of itself may not be considered unforeseen.

The

change in the tax law may have been unforeseen, but the sale of the
home may be argued to have been foreseen.
Thus Husband is at risk of not qualifying at all for the
6

$250,000.00 exclusion or any portion thereof. Whereas under prior
law, Husband could have at least rolled over any gain into a
subsequent home, Husband can no longer do so under the present law.
Therefore, Husband now faces paying taxes on the entire capital
gain for the year when the home sells.

It is inequitable for Wife

to receive most of the home equity, to have lived in the home for
two years since the divorce was granted, and yet to bear no
responsibility for capital gains taxes on the home.
It appears that this problem might be remedied to the benefit
of both parties.5 On remand, the trial court could find that Wife
has always been an owner of the home and reform the deed to include
her as a co-owner effective the original date of purchase.

It

could then award the home to Wife and order that it immediately be
sold with equities to be divided as otherwise ordered by the trial
court and, if applicable, as altered by this appeal process. Wife,
would then have been an owner for over five years and would have
lived in the home for over two years before the sale date.

This

strategy, if successful, would allow Wife to use a $250,000.00
exclusion and no taxes would result to the parties.
This Court must find that it was error for the trial court to
not consider capital gains taxes. It must remand with instructions
for the trial court to consider the new tax law and, unless

5

Husband's counsel on this appeal are not tax attorneys.
While they believe this scenario might work, the trial court should
receive evidence from a tax expert to verify potential usefulness
of the strategy. The trial court should order that tax liabilities
be shared by the parties if the strategy were to not work and
should order the parties to share the expenses of the tax expert.
7

otherwise justified, reform the deed, order title to pass to Wife
before the sale of the home with Wife ordered to claim the new
$250,000.00

exemption and order that the parties' equities be

distributed therefrom.

To the extent that the strategy is not

used, or does not work, the trial court must order Wife to pay onehalf of the capital gains taxes assessed

and one-half

of any

accountant and/or attorney's fees incurred in wrestling with the
IRS.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING HUSBAND
TO ASSUME ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE HOME EQUITY LINE OF
CREDIT WHERE $11,500.00 OF SUCH DEBT RESULTED FROM THE
TRIAL COURT'S EXCESSIVE TEMPORARY SUPPORT ORDER
This issue was reserved and argued by Husband in Defendant's
Written Comments to Court's Minute Entry.

(R. 1231-12 88)

Husband

therein argued, "The home equity line of credit was clearly used to
pay marital debts, obligations and support, and not the Defendant's
personal debt.

Therefore, the parties should be held

liable for the home equity line of debt."
further

argued,

"Based

upon

the

fact

(R. 1237)

that

equally
Husband

throughout

this

proceeding the Court has taxed the Defendant with imputed income at
a

level which he has never earned,

the Court

should use

its

equitable powers to afford the Defendant relief in the form of a
credit for the overpayments which he has made to the Plaintiff."
(R. 1240)
As shown at pages 26 to 28 of Brief of Appellant, the trial
court was confused in recalling loan balance amounts.

Whether by

accident or deliberate, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial
8

court to order Husband to pay the entire HELC balance where Husband
had been ordered to pay excessive temporary support.

In

Endrody,

the trial court properly declined to assess the husband the value
of cattle sold for $20,000.00 to pay for temporary support where
husband could not be employed at a level to supply such support.
Similarly, herein it is uncontroverted that Husband was ordered to
pay temporary support and expenses of $852.00 per month more than
he was by final order based upon his income.

Therefore, Wife must

be ordered to pay one-half of the HELC balance above $14,000.00.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
IMPUTE FULL-TIME WORK INCOME TO WIFE FOR PURPOSES OF
COMPUTING CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY
Wife advances the specious argument that Husband needs to
prove that Wife can work full-time.

It is Wife's burden to prove

that she cannot work full-time since it is her duty to support her
children under Sections 78-45-4(1) and 78-45-7.5(6) and (7), Utah
Code Annotated.

Beyond this, the evidence clearly showed that Wife

was capable of holding full-time employment, since she had such
employment with Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson but left it to
spend after-school time with the children.

(R. 1967-1975)

However, the issue herein is the trial court's failure to
consider Wife's ability to work without leaving early on days when
the children are with their father.
decision

upon

its

erroneous

The trial court rested its

recollection

of

Dr.

Stewart's

recommendation (that both parents adjust their schedules) as being
that Wife should work part-time.

As shown at page 34 of Brief of
9

Appellant, Wife has 10 weekdays per month when she is free to work
full days due to Husband having the children after school.
also

has

weekends

and

Husband's

summer

visitation

to

put

She
in

additional hours.
Wife's argument notwithstanding, she clearly testified that
her job was very flexible.
imputing

full-time

income

Therefore, the trial court erred in not
to

Wife,

or

alternatively,

in

not

reducing Husband's income to part-time based upon his need to be at
home with the children on the ten days each month that he has the
children after school.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING CHILD
SUPPORT BY IMPUTING 100 PERCENT OF INCOME AT THE MAXIMUM
TABLE AMOUNT TO HUSBAND AND ZERO TO WIFE WHERE HUSBAND'S
INCOME DID NOT MEET THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT AND WIFE HAD
SUBSTANTIAL INCOME
Wife does not directly reply to this point but presents her
own appeal on the issue in Point IX of her cross-appeal.

Husband

rests upon his prior argument and on his reply to Point IX of
Wife's cross-appeal.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT AWARDING THE
TAX DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS TO HUSBAND
Under Breinholt

v.

Breinholt,

905 P. 2d 877, 881

(Utah App.

1995), the trial court had the duty to enter specific findings
explaining its failure to award the exemptions to Husband.

It did

not do so and did not explain why it should not do so where it
ordered Husband to pay maximum support under the table, granted
Husband extensive visitation of the children with related living
10

expenses, did not require Wife to work full-time, granted Wife far
more

than

attorney's

one-half
fees

of

where

the

marital

they

were

property

and

granted

Wife

Under

these

unwarranted.

conditions, the matter must be remanded for such consideration.
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING WIFE
ATTORNEY'S FEES WHERE WIFE WAS WITHOUT NEED, HUSBAND WAS
WITHOUT ABILITY TO PAY AND ADEQUATE FINDINGS WERE NOT
ENTERED
Wife's argument inaccurately, but repeatedly stresses that
Husband

incurred

attorneys' fees.

and

had

the

ability

to

pay

$24,000.00

However, such misrepresents the fact that while

Husband incurred fees, he was not able to pay them.
liens over

in

Attorney's

$43,000.00 were entered against Husband's share of the

home equity because Husband's fees had not been paid.

(R. 1730)

This, plus Husband's inadequate share of the property award, leaves
Husband with little ability to pay Wife's fees.

Further, Wife's

much greater than half award of the property left her with the
ability to pay her own fees.
As argued in Brief of Appellant, the trial court received no
evidence to support Wife's contention that the $15,000.00 fees
awarded Wife arose from Husband's applications for relief from the
excessive temporary support order.

There is no evidentiary basis

to support such a finding of bad faith, or to show the actual
amount of fees which arose from Husband's applications for relief.

11

CROSS-APPEAL
POINT VII

(Cross-appeal)

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO INCLUDE INCOME
FROM HUSBAND'S SECOND JOB IN COMPUTING HIS TOTAL MONTHLY
INCOME FOR ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT PURPOSES
Objection
Husband,

initially objects to this issue being

considered

because Wife fails to marshal the evidence regarding her crossappeal.

A

cross-appellant,

"marshal

the

evidence

Selvage

findings".

v.

no

less

supporting
J.J.

Johnson

the

than

an

trial

appellant,

court's

& Associates,

must

pertinent

910 P.2d 1252,

1260 (Utah App. 1996) A complete failure to marshal or a selective
failure to marshal such evidence is grounds for this Court to
decline

to

address

an

issue

appealed.

(id.)

misrepresents or selectively cites to the record.

Wife

herein

Without waiving

such objection, Husband addresses Wife's claim as follows:
The trial court did not merely rely upon Husband's 1994 W-2.
The trial court reviewed Husband's 1993 and 1994 income tax returns
and his 1993 and 1994 W-2 tax statements before it "determined that
Defendant's 1994 income as set forth on his W-2 form from the Spine
Center is the best indicator of the Defendant's income prior to the
filing of this matter."

(Finding of Fact 6, R. 1638)

The trial

court also heard extensive testimony regarding Husband's employment
and income.6

(R. 153-166,

189-224, 267, 365-403, Exh. D-12)

6

This was not a case involving self-employment where gross
income was unclear. All of Husband's income is reflected by W-2's
or 1099's.
12

Also contrary to Wife's representation, the record does not
show that Husband "works only twenty-six hours per week at the
Spine

Center

to

earn

his

income."

(Brief

of

Appellee/Cross

Appellant, page 34) Husband testified that he was working "40-plus
hours per week".

(R. 2294)

His reference to 26 hours was to

"clinical hours" which are only a part of his full-time employment
as a physician:
A
Yes. You interrupted me and I was explaining
that my schedule hasn't been represented, so that puts me
at about 2 6 clinical hours in the office, and then I have
about half hour of dictation for each clinical hour,
which puts me at 3 9 hours. And then I have studying and
reading and research, and continuing medical education in
addition to that. And that is more than I worked the
previous year.
(R. 2295) 7
While

it

is

undisputed

that

Husband

took

a

second

job

reviewing files for the Utah Worker's Compensation fund in 19958,
such additional work was undertaken after the parties had separated
in August, 1994, and was necessitated by the trial court's overassessment of temporary support to be paid by Husband.

The trial

court accepted evidence of the second job acknowledging that it
needed to determine whether the job was "moonlighting or not."
(R.2300-1)

The trial court properly determined that the job was

moonlighting and declined to include it in determining Husband's
7

Wife's failure to cite the foregoing portions of the record
clearly constitute failure to marshal the evidence.
8

Husband testified that between April, 1995 and September,
1995, he was paid $1,635.00 by the Workman's Compensation Fund. He
had worked for them four hours during the month immediately prior
to trial at $12 5 per hour, thus making about $1,000.00 during that
month only.
(R. 2301)
13

historical earnings.
Wife's reliance upon Breinholt

v. Breinholt,
In Breinholt,

(Utah App. 1995) , is misplaced.

905 P. 2d 877, 880
the evidence showed

that the parties had, during the marriage, relied upon husband's
second check received from serving with the county commission to
pay household expenses.

This Court therein stated,

This court has previously held that when
determining an alimony award, "it is appropriate and
necessary for a trial court to consider all sources of
income that were used by the parties during their
marriage to meet their self-defined needs, from whatever
source--overtime, second job,
self-employment, etc., as

well as unearned

income.

(underlined emphasis added.)

In this case, at no time before the

parties separated in August, 1994, had the parties relied upon
Husband working more than one job. Wife has cited nothing from the
record to show that Husband had ever held multiple jobs "during
[the parties'] marriage to meet their self-defined needs."9
Wife's argument acknowledges that Husband took his second job
in

1995

after

pending.

the parties

(Brief

Therefore,

the

of

trial

had

separated

Appellee/Cross

and

this

Appellant,

court was well within

action
page

was

34-5) .

its discretion

in

finding that such additional job was moonlighting necessitated by
additional

living

expenses

associated

9

with

supporting

two

Two winters prior to the separation of the parties, Husband
had acted as a ski instructor in order to obtain ski discounts. (R.
2258) Husband earned about $800 in 1993 as a ski instructor. (R.
2494) Wife testified that Husband had not been a ski instructor
during the winter (1993-4) preceding the parties' separation in
August, 1994. (R. 2258) The trial court was clearly within its
discretion to disregard Husband's one-time ski instructing as
recreational and insignificant in terms of income.
14

households following the parties' separation and with Husband's
high

temporary

support

obligation.

A

contrary

rule

would

improperly discourage spouses from taking additional employment
pending divorce proceedings to meet related financial crises.
POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ASSESSED WIFE WITH HER PORTION
OF THE TAX BURDEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE IRA FUNDS
Objection
Husband, initially objects to this issue being considered
because Wife fails to marshal the evidence regarding her crossappeal.

A

"marshal

the

findings".

cross-appellant,
evidence

Selvage

v.

no

less

supporting

J.J.

Johnson

the

than

an

trial

appellant,

court's

& Associates,

must

pertinent

910 P.2d 1252,

1260 (Utah App. 1996) A complete failure to marshal or a selective
failure to marshal such evidence is grounds for this Court to
decline to address an issue appealed,
cites the finding of fact she disputes.
citations to the record.

(id.)

Wife herein simply

Her argument has no other

Without waiving such objection, Husband

addresses Wife's claim as follows:
As previously shown in Point I, Wife received a vastly greater
share of the marital property than did Husband.

Further, Husband

used $22,960.00 of the IRA funds to pay taxes, which benefitted
both parties and the value of such funds were no longer available
to Husband at the time of trial although they were credited to
Husband's property settlement.
Husband's share of the home equity was charged $29,597.00 as
Wife's net share of the $75,000.00 removed from the IRA by Husband.
15

Wife

had

$12,900.00

previously
withdrawal

received

$6,450.00

authorized

by

in

the

benefits

Court.

from

Since

the
Wife

effectively received $36,047.00 of the IRA, and since Husband did
not have equal property existing to be awarded to him, requiring
Wife to pay one-half of the taxes associated with the IRA, and all
but $645.00 of the penalty, was most reasonable and an appropriate
use of the Court's discretion.
Additionally, the trial court appropriately found "that the
parties will save money if they are required to file jointly for
tax year 1994."

Indeed, such joint filing reduced the combined tax

burden that would have had to be allocated between the parties if
they had filed separately.
When it is recognized that $22,960.00 of the IRA funds were
paid by Husband for 1994 taxes in August, 1994, for both parties'
benefit and were not available to be divided at time of trial10,
Wife must pay one-half of the taxes on such funds in order that the
parties equally

share the tax obligation.

Taxes owed on the

$22,960.00 used to pay the parties' taxes must be equally shared
between the parties.
Husband

was

required

to

pay

$6,855.00

of

the

penalty

associated with early withdrawal of the $75,000.00, while Wife was
required to pay only $645.00 associated with her one-half of the
$12,900.00 authorized to be withdrawn by the Court.
resided together most of 1994.

The parties

Therefore, Wife was not prejudiced

by the allocation of 1994 tax responsibility.
10

As argued in Point I.
16

POINT IX
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE EXTRAPOLATED BEYOND THE
CHILD SUPPORT TABLE TO CALCULATE CHILD SUPPORT.
OBJECTION
Husband, initially objects to this issue being considered
because Wife fails to marshal the evidence regarding her crossappeal.

A cross-appellant, no less than an appellant, must

"marshal

the evidence supporting
Selvage

findings".

v.

J.J.

Johnson

the trial court's pertinent
& Associates,

910 P.2d 1252,

1260 (Utah App. 1996) A complete failure to marshal or a selective
failure to marshal such evidence is grounds for this Court to
decline to address an issue appealed.

(id.)

Wife fails to even

cite the finding she disputes, let alone the factual record.
Without waiving such objection, Husband addresses Wife's claim as
follows:
Wife's argument on this point is void of factual or legal
references in the record to support her argument. Also, her claim
at page 39 of her brief that sports activities are not anticipated
by support figures set forth in the Table for determining support
levels is not supported by citation to any legal authority.

Wife

fails to acknowledge that Husband's visitation time with the
children is much greater than that provided

in the standard

visitation schedule11 and that Husband's expenses associated with
food and other necessities for the children is higher than that
anticipated by the Table in any event.

lx

See Brief of Appellant, Point IV, page 34, Point V, pages 36.
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Husband has fully addressed this issue in Point V of Brief of
Appellant,

pages

respectfully

35-40.

refers

Rather

the

Court

than

repeat

thereto.

himself,

The

Court

Husband

erred

in

assessing 100 percent of the parties' income to Husband and should
have assessed support at $1,12 0.00 rather than $1,400.00.

Wife

certainly is not entitled to a windfall of child support greater
than $1,400.00 where Husband has possession of the children so much
of the time.
POINT X
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
WIFE'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED UPON NEWLY-DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE THAT HUSBAND DISSIPATED MARITAL ASSETS
Objection
Husband, initially objects to this issue being

considered

because Wife fails to marshal the evidence regarding her crossappeal .

A

"marshal

the

findings11.

cross-appellant,
evidence

Selvage

no

supporting

v. J.J.

Johnson

less
the

than

an

trial

& Associates,

appellant,

court's

must

pertinent

910 P. 2d 1252,

1260 (Utah App. 1996) A complete failure to marshal or a selective
failure to marshal such evidence is grounds for this Court to
decline to address an issue appealed.

(id.)

Wife herein simply

cites the ruling she disputes. Her argument has no other citations
to the record.
Further, Wife's statements that she "learned for the first
time

a trust

for his

daughter" is a complete misrepresentation to this Court.

At trial

Wife

during

trial

introduced

that Dr. Bova had

Exhibit

P-9

set up

(R. 2173-2174, 2203),
18

a portfolio

listing which included the Strong Discovery Fund balance as of
October 7, 1995. Wife was obviously aware of the fund before she
went to trial since it was she who brought Exhibit P-9 to court.
Without waiving his failure to marshal objection, Husband addresses
Wife's claim as follows:
As shown, Wife prior to trial was aware of the existence of
the "trust fund" established on behalf of Husband's daughter,
Melissa.

She introduced Exhibit P-9 (R. 2173, 2203) and requested

that her share of the marital estate be enhanced by monies paid by
Husband

into irrevocable gift accounts

for the parties' two

children, Mikell and Christopher, and for Melissa, Husband's
daughter by a prior marriage, (id.)

The trial court never made

such adjustment in its rulings.12 Such was proper as the children,
not Husband, benefitted

from such accounts and there was no

evidence provided that Husband had unreasonably established or
funded such accounts.
Wife, being aware of the accounts set forth in Exhibit P-9,
was obligated through discovery procedures to obtain additional
information of the account status prior to trial, if she intended
to make the amounts of the accounts an issue at trial.
failed to do.
J.P.,

K.D.,

In the case In re State

of Utah,

This she

in the Interest

of

and K.D. , Persons under Eighteen Years of Age, 921 P.2d

1012, 1017, (Utah App. 1996) this Court stated,
12

Wife's argument creates the erroneous impression that Wife
had asked only that she be credited one-half of the value of funds
paid to Melissa's account, whereas Wife testified that she desired
to be credited one-half of the funds deposited into all three
children's accounts. (R. 2173)
19

Under established Rule 59 case law, the moving party
must prove the evidence offered meets three requirements
for a new trial to be granted. > Id. at 57-58. "First,
it must be material, competent evidence which is in fact
newly discovered. Second, it must be such that it could
not, by due diligence, have been discovered and produced
at trial." > Id. at 58. "Finally, it must not be merely
cumulative or incidental, but must be of sufficient
substance that there is a reasonable likelihood that with
it there would have been a different result."
> Id.
Additionally, " [n] ewly discovered evidence must relate to
facts which were 'in existence at the time of trial.' "
> In re Disconnection of Certain Territory, 668 P.2d 544,
549 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted); see > In re S.R.,
735 P.2d at 58.
The

trial

court

properly

denied

Wife's

motion

on

the

second

requirement above set forth, to-wit: "that the Court believes the
information

upon

which

the Motion

is based

was

Plaintiff through discovery prior to trial."

available

(R. 1855)

to

Wife

should have obtained the account records during discovery, if she
intended to make them an issue.13
POINT XI
WIPE SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED ON
APPEAL
Objection
Husband,

initially objects to this issue being

considered

because Wife fails to marshal the evidence regarding her crossappeal.

A

cross-appellant,

"marshal

the

evidence

Selvage

findings".

v.

1260 (Utah App. 1996)

no

supporting
J.J.

Johnson

less
the

than

an

trial

& Associates,

appellant,

court's

must

pertinent

910 P.2d 1252,

A complete failure to marshal or a selective

13

The trial court would have been further correct in denying
the motion on the first and third requirements as the "new"
evidence was not really newly new and would have been cumulative or
incidental in any effect.
20

failure to marshal such evidence is grounds for this Court to
decline to address an issue appealed,

(id.)

Wife herein simply

asks for attorney's fees on appeal without providing any factual
record

regarding

her

need,

Husband's

ability

to

pay,

and

reasonableness.
In Point V of Brief of Appellant, Husband fully addresses the
legal requirements for an award of attorney's fees and shows 1)
that Wife had no need for an award of attorney's fees at trial
given her generous property award, 2) that given the gross inequity
of the property division and his own fees, Husband was without
ability to pay Wife's fees, and 3) that Wife had provided no
evidentiary basis regarding the reasonableness of the award of
attorney's fees awarded at trial.
Husband's appeal is clearly based upon good faith issues which
require

review

by

this

Court.

Wife

should

not

be

awarded

attorney's fees on appeal.

CONCLUSION
Neither party has challenged the decree granting each party a
divorce.

However, the other rulings of the trial court addressed

herein must be reversed and the case remanded as requested by
Husband.

The trial court must be instructed to properly credit

Husband's property settlement $21,756.50; to order that the home be
deeded to, and immediately sold by Wife with the parties' equities
protected, or, with Wife to be responsible for one-half of the
capital gains taxes from the sale of the home and any professional
fees paid to tax experts; to order Wife to be responsible for one21

half

of

the

home

equity

loan balance

between

$14,000.00

and

$25,435.00 [($25,435.00-$14,000.00)/2=$5,717.50]; to impute fulltime income to Wife for purposes of child support and alimony; to
allocate

child

support pro

rata

on the parties' incomes at a

maximum income of $10,000.00 as set forth in Husband's prior brief;
to award Husband the tax dependency exemptions; and to order Wife
to pay her own attorney's fees.
Wife's appeal must be rejected on all points, but if upheld on
any point, such change must indicate how other rulings may be
adjusted thereby.

For example, if Wife were to be awarded more

child support, she would need less alimony and there would be even
less need for her to recover her attorney's fees or for her to
receive the exemptions/deductions for the children.
DATED this

/

r

day of October, 1997.

J^t^^^^

^**<g&^^
PAUL W. MORTENSEN
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed 2 true and correct copies of
APPELLANT#S REPLY BRIEF to the following individual at the address
shown, via first-class mail, postage prepaid on this
/&' y<*day of
October, 1997:
Rodney R. Parker
Attorney at Law
PO Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
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ADDENDUM

APPENDIX A:

IRS Code S e c t i o n

121
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H.R.2014
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (Enrolled Bill (Sent to President))

SEC. 312. EXEMPTION FROM TAX FOR GAIN ON SALE OF PRINCIPAL
RESIDENCE.
(a) IN GENERAL- Section 121 (relating to one-time exclusion of gain from sale of principal
residence by individual who has attained age 55) is amended to read as follows:

SEC. 121. EXCLUSION OF GAIN FROM SALE OF PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE.
'(a) EXCLUSION- Gross income shall not include gain from the sale or exchange of property if,
during the 5-year period ending on the date of the sale or exchange, such property has been owned
and used by the taxpayer as the taxpayer's principal residence for periods aggregating 2 years or
more.
\b) LIMITATIONSXI) IN GENERAL- The amount of gain excluded from gross income under subsection (a)
with respect to any sale or exchange shall not exceed $250,000.
X2) $500,000 LIMITATION FOR CERTAIN JOINT RETURNS- Paragraph (1) shall be
applied by substituting '$500,000' for '$250,000' ifXA) a husband and wife make a joint return for the taxable year of the sale or
exchange of the property,
XB) either spouse meets the ownership requirements of subsection (a) with respect to
such property,
XQ both spouses meet the use requirements of subsection (a) with respect to such
property, and
XD) neither spouse is ineligible for the benefits of subsection (a) with respect to such
property by reason of paragraph (3).
X3) APPLICATION TO ONLY 1 SALE OR EXCHANGE EVERY 2 YEARSXA) IN GENERAL- Subsection (a) shall not apply to any sale or exchange by the
taxpayer if, during the 2-year period ending on the date of such sale or exchange,
there was any other sale or exchange by the taxpayer to which subsection (a) applied.
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XB) PRE-MAY 7, 1997, SALES NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT- Subparagraph
(A) shall be applied without regard to any sale or exchange before May 7, 1997.
Xc) EXCLUSION FOR TAXPAYERS FAILING TO MEET CERTAIN REQUIREMENTSXI) IN GENERAL- In the case of a sale or exchange to which this subsection applies, the
ownership and use requirements of subsection (a) shall not apply and subsection (b)(3) shall
not apply; but the amount of gain excluded from gross income under subsection (a) with
respect to such sale or exchange shall not exceed—
XA) the amount which bears the same ratio to the amount which would be so
excluded under this section if such requirements had been met, as
'(B) the shorter of—
Xi) the aggregate periods, during the 5-year period ending on the date of such
sale or exchange, such property has been owned and used by the taxpayer as the
taxpayer's principal residence, or
Xii) the period after the date of the most recent prior sale or exchange by the
taxpayer to which subsection (a) applied and before the date of such sale or
exchange,
bears to 2 years.
X2) SALES AND EXCHANGES TO WHICH SUBSECTION APPLIES- This subsection
shall apply to any sale or exchange if—
XA) subsection (a) would not (but for this subsection) apply to such sale or exchange
by reason of—
Xi) a failure to meet the ownership and use requirements of subsection (a), or
Xii) subsection (b)(3), and
'(B) such sale or exchange is by reason of a change in place of employment, health,
or, to the extent provided in regulations, unforeseen circumstances.
Xd) SPECIAL RULESXI) JOINT RETURNS- If a husband and wife make a joint return for the taxable year of the
sale or exchange of the property, subsections (a) and (c) shall apply if either spouse meets
the ownership and use requirements of subsection (a) with respect to such property.
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H.R.2014
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (Enrolled BUI (Sent to President))

SEC. 311. MAXIMUM CAPITAL GAINS RATES FOR INDIVIDUALS.
(a) IN GENERAL- Subsection (h) of section 1 (relating to maximum capital gains rate) is
amended to read as follows:
'(h) MAXIMUM CAPITAL GAINS RATEXI) IN GENERAL- If a taxpayer has a net capital gain for any taxable year, the tax imposed
by this section for such taxable year shall not exceed the sum of—
'(A) a tax computed at the rates and in the same manner as if this subsection had not
been enacted on the greater of—
\ i ) taxable income reduced by the net capital gain, or
'(ii) the lesser of—
'(I) the amount of taxable income taxed at a rate below 28 percent, or
XII) taxable income reduced by the adjusted net capital gain, plus
XB) 25 percent of the excess (if any) of—
Xi) the unrecaptured section 1250 gain (or, if less, the net capital gain), over
Xii) the excess (if any) of—
XI) the sum of the amount on which tax is determined under
subparagraph (A) plus the net capital gain, over
XII) taxable income, plus
XQ 28 percent of the amount of taxable income in excess of the sum of—
Xi) the adjusted net capital gain, plus
Xii) the sum of the amounts on which tax is determined under subparagraphs
(A) and (B), plus
XD) 10 percent of so much of the taxpayer's adjusted net capital gain (or, if less,
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taxable income) as does not exceed the excess (if any) of~
\i) the amount of taxable income which would (without regard to this
paragraph) be taxed at a rate below 28 percent, over
\ii) the taxable income reduced by the adjusted net capital gain, plus
"(E) 20 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted net capital gain (or, if less, taxable income)
in excess of the amount on which a tax is determined under subparagraph (D).
\2) REDUCED CAPITAL GAIN RATES FOR QUALIFIED 5-YEAR GAIN\A) REDUCTION IN 10-PERCENT RATE- In the case of any taxable year
beginning after December 31, 2000, the rate under paragraph (1)(D) shall be 8 percent
with respect to so much of the amount to which the 10-percent rate would otherwise
apply as does not exceed qualified 5-year gain, and 10 percent with respect to the
remainder of such amount.
"(B) REDUCTION IN 20-PERCENT RATE- The rate under paragraph (1)(E) shall be
18 percent with respect to so much of the amount to which the 20-percent rate would
otherwise apply as does not exceed the lesser of—
\i) the excess of qualified 5-year gain over the amount of such gain taken into
account under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, or
\ii) the amount of qualified 5-year gain (determined by taking into account
only property the holding period for which begins after December 31, 2000),
and 20 percent with respect to the remainder of such amount. For purposes of
determining under the preceding sentence whether the holding period of property
begins after December 31, 2000, the holding period of property acquired pursuant to
the exercise of an option (or other right or obligation to acquire property) shall
include the period such option (or other right or obligation) was held.
\3) NET CAPITAL GAIN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AS INVESTMENT INCOME- For
purposes of this subsection, the net capital gain for any taxable year shall be reduced (but
not below zero) by the amount which the taxpayer takes into account as investment income
under section 163(d)(4)(B)(iii).
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